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This was more or less the message from a
New Jersey appellate court, which rejected
most of the discrimination claims brought
by a group of female casino waitresses who
were suspended, fired, or otherwise
subjected to a policy restricting weight
gain. In a rambling and sometimes poorly
reasoned opinion, Schiavo v. Marina
District Development Company
(http://law.justia.com/cases/new
jersey/appellatedivisionpublished/2015/a598312.html) , a New Jersey appellate

court joins a long line of courts that simply refuse to see the illegal and harmful
stereotyping embodied in sexspecific dress codes.
Just What Exactly is a BorgataBabe?
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/29/hitthegymborgatababes

1/8

9/30/2015

Hit the Gym, BorgataBabes | Joanna L. Grossman | Verdict | Legal Analysis and Commentary from Justia

According to the appellate court in Schiavo, Atlantic City was “changed forever” in 2003
by the opening of the Borgata, a “Las Vegasstyle resort.” Among other differentiating
features, the casino created a special group of costumed beverage servers called
BorgataBabes, who were supposed to reflect the “fun, upscale, sensual international
image that is consistent with the Borgata brand.”
A recruiting brochure spells out the image in more detail. The BorgataBabes are
“beautiful,” “charming,” and “bringing drinks.” She “moves toward you like a movie star,”
and her smile melts “the ice in your water.” Helpfully, when “you forget your own name,”
she “kindly remembers it for you.” And you “relax in the knowledge that there are no
calories in eye candy.”
More than 4000 people applied to be one of the first 200 BorgataBabes. Applicants who
made it to the final round were interviewed and made to perform, in costume, mock
customer scenarios. The court emphasizes that applicants were advised of the Personal
Appearance Standards (PAS) to which they would have to adhere to get hired—and to
stay employed. Women were to have a “natural hourglass shape,” while men were to have
a natural “V” shape (broad shoulders and a slim waist). Women were to have naturally
styled hair and “tasteful, professional makeup that complimented their facial features.”
Men were to be clean shaven or have neatly trimmed and “sculpted” facial hair.
When the initial group was hired, they signed a contract providing that they would have
to “maintain approximately the same physical appearance in the assigned costume” and
“appear to be comfortable while wearing the assigned costume for which you were fitted.”
For men, the costume consisted of a fitted black tshirt and black pants. For women, the
costume was, in the court’s description, “form fitting, skimpy, and reminiscent of a Las
Vegasthemed casino.” (Searching #BorgataBabe will take you to many pictures on the
Internet, showing the standard costume of a black bustier and miniskirt with high heels.)
The costumes were designed by Zac Posen, who designed Emmy gowns this year for the
likes of Amy Schumer, Sarah Hyland, and Tracee Ellis Ross.
A year after the casino opened, the PAS were modified to make the “maintain your
appearance” requirement more objective. BorgataBabes were not permitted to gain or
lose more than 7 percent of their baseline weight—roughly the amount of weight that
would cause a change of one clothing size. There was no fixed schedule for weighins;
they occurred when a manager observed an “illfitting” costume, when a server returned
from a leave of absence, and when a costume change was requested. According to
company policy, a BorgataBabe who failed the weighin—whose weight had increased by
more than 7 percent—would be given a period to bring his or her weight into compliance,
with the assistance of companyfunded weightloss programs and gym memberships.
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/29/hitthegymborgatababes
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In 2008, one woman filed a complaint alleging that the PAS violated state anti
discrimination law, “as informed by Title VII.” Subsequently, several other complaints
were filed, and the cases were all consolidated. All told, twentyone women who had been
subjected to the PAS—many suspended for excessive weight gain—were discriminatory in
form and implementation. Women in that group had different outcomes—some brought
their weight into compliance and retained their jobs; some requested transfers to a non
PAS position in anticipation of termination; some quit; and some were excused based on
a medical condition affecting weight control.
The lawsuit raised the following complaints:
the PAS were based on gender stereotypes;
the weightgain standard was not applied equally to men and women (e.g., men
were not subjected to weighins and could avoid requesting larger costumes by
replacing the nondescript shirt and pants themselves);
the policy had a disparate impact—no men were suspended for noncompliance,
while over twenty women were;
enforcement of the weightgain policy was harassing and sexually suggestive (e.g.,
managers would snort like pigs when a woman suspected of excessive weight gain
walked by or would ask if she “was pregnant or just getting fat”).
Is any of this, if proven, actionable?
A Long Path with Little Progress: The Law of Dress and Grooming Codes
Sexspecific dress and grooming codes have been challenged under Title VII, which bans
all forms of sex discrimination by employers, since the mid1970s. (These lawsuits often
include claims under analogous state antidiscrimination laws.
Title VII prohibits employment actions “based on sex,” making no exception for specific
types of discrimination or “de minimis” inequalities. Yet, there has been a longstanding
anomaly in Title VII case law that permits employers to maintain sexspecific dress and
grooming codes. In an early case, Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing
Company (http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate
courts/F2/507/1084/4877/) (1975), a federal appellate court upheld a rule requiring
men (and only men) to have short hair, while women were permitted to wear theirs long.
The court refused to acknowledge the stereotypes reflected in the rule, observing simply
that hair length was not immutable, and men could comply with the rule simply enough
by just getting a hair cut. (For a modern twist on this scenario in the educational context,
read here (https://verdict.justia.com/2014/03/18/hairmakesman) .) In later cases,
courts have ruled that employers can require men to wear business suits and ties, while
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/29/hitthegymborgatababes
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requiring women to wear dresses. They have also allowed employers to impose
requirements that women wear makeup, while prohibiting men from doing the same
thing.
I describe these decisions as anomalous because they seem to permit precisely what Title
VII forbids: treating employees differently on the basis of sex. And the reasoning courts
offer is generally unconvincing, questionbegging, and employs the very same
stereotyping that led the employers to adopt the rule in the first place. Take the
Willingham case, mentioned above. The court in that case stated that discrimination laws
generally protect people based on immutable characteristics—on the theory that people
should not be arbitrarily disadvantaged because of something they can’t change. And hair
length, the court noted, is mutable, not immutable. But hair is not the alleged basis for
discrimination, sex is. And sex cannot easily be changed.
Courts often resort to platitudes about “good business” and the latitude employers need
to run things the way they see fit. But the thrust of antidiscrimination law is to override
the decisions of employers that unfairly disadvantage certain groups of workers,
regardless in most cases of the impact on business. We do not, for example, allow
employers to hire only white workers even if customers prefer them; nor do we allow
employers to fire older workers and replace them with younger ones based on the
stereotype that they will be more energetic and efficient.
Other courts have had the gall to suggest that dress and grooming codes, though sex
specific, are actually gender neutral because men and women are both required to adhere
to a dress code based on generally accepted community standards. That these standards
are different and largely, if not exclusively, the product of sex stereotypes is ignored.
The one exception that emerged in more recent cases is that employers cannot impose an
undue burden on one sex, but not the other. An employer thus cannot require women to
wear uniforms, while allowing men to choose their own attire. But employers can force
men and women to wear different uniforms, as long as they are deemed “comparable.”
The early dress and grooming code cases, which preceded the Supreme Court’s 1989
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
(http://supreme.justia.com/us/490/228/) , are less surprising. In that case, the Court
held that sex stereotyping is a form of illegal sex discrimination. A logical extension of
that ruling might be that sexspecific codes are invalid if they reflect, reinforce, or
perpetuate gender stereotypes. And although some modern courts have used this analysis
in dress and grooming cases brought by transgender individuals (challenging policies
forcing them to align their dress with their anatomical sex), they have all but refused to
do the same in cases brought by women. (Some of the transgender cases are discussed
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/29/hitthegymborgatababes
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here (http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090303.html) and here
(http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20080930.html) .)
This oversight was nowhere more apparent than in Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co. (http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate
courts/F3/444/1104/546333/) , in which an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a grooming code that required female bartenders to wear teased hair, a
full face of makeup, and painted fingernails, while requiring of male bartenders only that
they have short hair and be clean. And while the court acknowledged the unequal burden
test, it refused to take judicial notice of the fact that the dress code for women was time
consuming and expensive, while the dress code for men was quick and cheap. As Deborah
Rhode has noted, however, even a “proper” application of the unequal burden test does
not “capture all of what makes these regulations objectionable. Darlene Jespersen
resisted Harrah’s makeup requirement not because it took more time and money for her
to be presentable than her male counterparts, but because she felt that being “dolled up”
was degrading and undermined her credibility with unruly customers. Dress codes that
require women to wear skirts and high heels are problematic for similar reasons,
regardless of what the codes demand of men.
The BorgataBabes case adds in an additional issue: grooming codes based on weight. Is
discrimination law relevant to such rules? There is strong research showing that women
are judged more harshly than men for exceeding conventional weight expectations.
Weight discrimination results in a variety of adverse consequences, including
disproportionately low pay. And because being overweight is more common for poor
women and women of color, weight discrimination exacerbates discrimination based on
race and class. But Title VII does not directly protect against weight discrimination, and
neither do most state antidiscrimination laws. But when weight standards are set or
applied unevenly, they can be challenged as sex discrimination.
For example, in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.
(http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellatecourts/F3/216/845/570308/) , the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a policy that permitted men’s weight to
vary more by height than women’s was invalid sex discrimination. But aligning weight
ranges might be just the tip of the iceberg. Women tend to gain more weight as they get
older than men and can have dramatic shifts in body weight and shape because of
pregnancy. Thus even a neutral rule limiting weight gain can have a disparate impact on
women.
The Ruling in Schiavo v. Marina District Development Company
At the trial level, all of the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed on summary judgment. The
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/29/hitthegymborgatababes
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presiding judge found that the PAS were “reasonable in light of casino industry standards
and customer expectations,” and did not reflect discriminatory treatment of women.
On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal of most of the claims, but reversed as to one.
The plaintiffs are entitled, in the court’s view, to go to trial on the sexbased harassment
claims. The court recited a long list of examples that might constitute illegal harassment
based on gender, including: requiring a postpartum woman to weigh in more than once
on the day she returned; punishment under the PAS even when proper medical
documentation should have warranted an exception under the policy’s own terms;
comments to the effect that women shouldn’t come back to work after having children
because they are too fat; suggestion to one postpartum woman that she should pump out
breast milk to make weight; accusing women of lying about being pregnant to avoid
weighins. The court correctly recognized that these instances support the claim that
women were singled out for harassing conduct not based on weight alone, but on the
interaction with gender and pregnancy. (It is somewhat shocking that the trial court,
reviewing the same evidence, concluded that these claims did not even warrant further
factfinding before being dismissed.)
But the clear reasoning of the appellate opinion ends here. The court affirmed the grant
of summary judgment to the employer on all other claims—that the PAS embodied
gender stereotyping; that the weight standard was enforced in a discriminatory fashion;
and that the PAS weight standard had a disparate impact on women. Let’s take the court’s
analysis of each claim in turn.
With respect to the first theory of discrimination—a facial policy embodying gender
stereotyping—the appellate court resorted to the familiar, if erroneous, reasoning that
dress codes can be sexspecific and yet nondiscriminatory. The court cited Price
Waterhouse for the proposition that we are “beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
with their group” and yet upheld the legality of a dress policy that required women to
dress in skimpy, formfitting outfits, while allowing men to wear a tshirt and pants.
Although the court purports to agree with the statement that customer preferences
cannot justify “the use of stereotyping gender roles in employment positions,” it notes, in
defense of the dolledup female costume, that in the casino business the “costume may
lend authenticity to the intended entertainment atmosphere.” And if it forces women to
wear revealing, sexy clothing, but not the men, well so be it. The court actually admits
that the “costume and physical fitness standards imposed what many would label an
‘archaic stereotype’ of male and female physiques,’” but finds no fault in it despite the
ruling in Price Waterhouse.
And after reviewing a series of cases that also refuse to engage with the real issue—that
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/29/hitthegymborgatababes
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dress codes like this are drowning in sex stereotypes—the court identified the following
“general principle”:
When an employer’s ‘reasonable workplace appearance, grooming and dress
standards’ comply with State or federal law prohibiting discrimination, even if
they contain sexspecific language, the policies do not violate Title VII, and by
extension, the [New Jersey analog.]”
So, in other words, a policy that complies with the law does not violate the law?
The court then also rejects the claim of disparate impact. Federal and state anti
discrimination laws prohibit neutral policies that have a disparate impact on one sex
unless justified by business necessity. Given that no men were punished under the
weightgain policy, while many women were, this claim seems at least worthy of serious
analysis. But the court is unimpressed and criticizes the plaintiffs for relying on “sheer
numbers,” even though that is the crux of a disparate impact claim. (The court then
confusingly concludes that “simple statistical disparities are insufficient to show the
weight standard was facially discriminatory,” as if that damns the disparate impact
claim.) The court never explains why it rejects the disparate impact claim. Is the sample
size too small to generate statistically significant comparisons? Is the disparity between
men and women too small to be significant? Was the disparate impact justified by
business necessity? None of these questions is answered. Nor is the employer forced to
explain why men were reweighed so much less frequently than women. Instead, the
court just concludes that there was no evidence of a disparate impact. The numbers,
however, would seem to suggest otherwise.
Conclusion
This is a disappointing case, but not only because of the outcome. The disappointment is
in the refusal of modernday courts, against a backdrop of strong antidiscrimination
laws and Supreme Court precedent, even to look more closely at dress and grooming
policies that so obviously reflect and reinforce gender stereotypes. We aren’t supposed to
be living in Archie Bunker’s world anymore—where “girls were girls and men were
men”—and yet people are afraid of the alternative. Equal opportunity in employment
means more than allowing women to work; it means respecting their competence and
ability whether or not they live up to stereotype.

https://verdict.justia.com/2015/09/29/hitthegymborgatababes
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